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Abstract. Anonymity revocation is an essential component of credential issuing systems since
unconditional anonymity is incompatible with pursuing and sanctioning credential misuse. However,
current anonymity revocation approaches have shortcomings with respect to the auditability of the
revocation process. In this paper, we propose a novel anonymity revocation approach based on
privacy-preserving blockchain-based smart contracts, where the code self-execution property ensures
availability and public ledger immutability provides auditability. We describe an instantiation of this
approach, provide an implementation thereof and conduct a series of evaluations in terms of running
time, gas cost and latency. The results show that our scheme is feasible and efficient.
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1 Introduction
Anonymity revocation was first discussed by von Solms and Naccache [31], as they pointed
out that Chaum’s blind signatures [10] could potentially lead to nonpunishable crime.
Subsequently, anonymity revocation has been studied comprehensively, especially in e-cash
systems designed to combat money laundering and blackmailing [2,7,9]. The idea of adding
anonymity revocation to anonymous credential systems was first proposed by Camenisch
and Lysyanskaya [6], where they offered an optional anonymity tracing approach to find the
identity of pseudonymous tokens involved in suspicious transactions. In general, anonymity
revocation in a credential system allows an issuer to find out who the owner of an anonymous
credential is.
The blindness issuance property of an anonymous credential system prevents an issuer
from completing the task of anonymity revocation by themselves. The party who helps the
issuer to reveal the identity is referred to as revelator. Intuitively, there are two parties that
can act as the revelator: the user (credential holder) and the judge (trusted third party).
Voluntary anonymity revocation by the user is usually straightforward. The issuer cannot
link the identity, the message and the resulting signature together unless the user does.
One typical example is Microsoft’s U-Prove [28]. In such a system, the issuing protocol and
the showing protocol are unlinkable. Even if the issuer colludes with the verifier, it cannot
associate the message with the resulting signature. The only possibility is that the user
chooses to lift the anonymity. Meanwhile, lifting anonymity by a judge, which is inspired
by fair blind signature scheme [15], is widely used in systems such as [29,8,12,30]. Taking
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ABC4Trust [30] as an example, it introduced an inspector to uncover the user who created
a presentation token to prevent abuse.
However, some weaknesses in the mentioned anonymity revocation approaches still
remain. Firstly, revealing anonymity through the credential holder relies too heavily on
the user’s will, which ultimately leads to the nonavailability problem. This means if a user
behaves maliciously and rejects to cooperate with the issuer, the issuer would never learn
the relationship between the identity and the credential. Furthermore, even if the user is
honest, they may be offline, resulting in the failure of blindness removal. Meanwhile, in the
majority of previous proposals revealing anonymity through the judge lacks transparency,
which raises some security concerns: (1) even without the user’s consent, the issuer and the
judge may conspire to map the credential to the real identity of that user; (2) the judge is
a single point of failure. More importantly, the user has no auxiliary information to detect
whether the judge has been compromised or not. These challenges lead to the following
question:
Is it possible to build an anonymity revocation mechanism that satisfies the require-
ments: (1) the process of lifting anonymity is transparent and auditable; (2) the
revelator always accept revealing the anonymity if necessary?
In this paper, we give a positive answer to this question. Instead of using a trusted
third party, we use a neutral and transparent privacy-preserving smart contract as the
revelator (to revoke the blindness). The self-execution property of the smart contract
ensures the availability of the revelator. This means the neutral blockchain is always honest
and is willing to revoke the anonymity whenever it is needed by the issuer. Meanwhile,
our privacy-preserving smart contract-based approach allows anonymity revocation in an
auditable manner. More precisely, the anonymity tracing must interact with the privacy-
preserving smart contract that “lives” on the blockchain and automatically renders the
progress auditable. Such revocation progress is recorded in a blockchain transaction which is
publicly visible. This auditability provided by the smart contract calling records avoids the
misuse of revocation and reduces potential collusion problems to a great extent. Furthermore,
the transparent contract calling records provide the user with auxiliary information to
detect whether the issuer has been compromised.
In addition, our scheme brings the benefit of greater availability. The service of blockchain
is maintained by a large group of nodes [26], which avoids the offline revelator problem.
Alternatively, the high-availability blockchain service, being continuously online, provides
greater actualization of blindness disclosure and the tracer could trace the identity or
credential at any time.
In summary, the contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
– We propose a new auditable blind credential system based on privacy-preserving smart
contracts, which provides a powerful auditability and neutrality for credential anonymity
revocation
– We give an instantiation of our construction and provide a proof of concept implementa-
tion. The performance evaluation shows that our scheme is feasible and efficient.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: further related work is discussed in
Section 2. Notation and cryptographic building blocks are presented in Section 3. An
overview of our construction is given in Section 4, followed by an instantiation in Section 5.
The implementation and evaluation of the instantiation are detailed out in Section 6. Some
example applications are given in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes with some future
work.
2 Related Work
In this section, we first survey current anonymity revocation approaches and make a
comparison with our solution. Then, we give some background on blockchain and privacy-
preserving smart contracts.
In the last few decades, a series of works [33,1,20,15], have been proposed in the field of
anonymity revocation, especially in e-cash systems. Brickell et al. [3] introduced the first
trustee-based tracing electronic cash system, in which the coin owner can be revealed by
several publicly appointed trustees. Camenisch et al. [7] proposed an anonymous digital
payment system with a passive anonymity-revoking trustee. In their system, the trustee only
needs to be involved in the anonymity-revoking progress rather than the regular transactions
such as opening a new account. Jakobsson and Yung [17] presented an e-money system
that makes the value of funds and user anonymity revocable with the consumer rights
organisations, even given an extreme condition that an active attacker gets the bank’s key
or forces the bank to release the money.
In 1995, a fair blind signature scheme was first proposed by Stadler et al. [33]. It
involved a judge and allowed this judge to deliver information to the signer to link the
issuing session and the resulting message-signature pair. Later, Jakobsson and Yung [18]
pointed out that the reused session identifier may make the anonymity revocation invalid, and
proposed a fair blind signature scheme that guarantees the one-to-one mapping revocability
between the issuing session and the resulting signature. Thereafter, Hufschmitt et al. [16]
presented a formal security model for fair blind signatures in the random oracle model.
Then, based on Hufschmitt’s model, Fuchsbauer et al. [15] proposed a fair blind signature
scheme that is not based on the random oracle model. To the best of our knowledge,
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [6] was the first to use anonymity revocation in the credential
system. They offered an optional approach to trace the identity of the pseudonymous token
for some transactions. After that, some practical systems like IBM’s Identity Mixer [8],
ABC4Trust [30] started to consider the anonymity revocation. An interesting revocation
approach is traceable anonymous certificate [22]. It allows one sub-issuer to verify the
ownership of a user and another sub-issuer to validate the contents. Then, these two issuers
collaborate to map the certificate to its real identity.
However, the aforementioned anonymity revocation approaches have some drawbacks:
the repudiation and the lack of auditability in the revocation progress. The assumptions
that the revelator always remains honest is unrealistic. The revelator may be offline when
it is needed, or may conspire with the issuer to seek profits, or even be entirely controlled
by an attacker. Our scheme is the first to use a privacy-preserving smart contract as the
4 R. Li, D. Galindo, and Q. Wang
revelator to solve the above problems. The self-executing nature of the contract ensures
the neutrality of the revelator. The transparent contract calling records guarantee that the
revelator’s revocation progress is auditable. The continuous blockchain service keeps the
high-availability of the revelator.
Privacy-preserving smart contracts. The concept of a smart contract, as a primary
application of blockchain technologies [26], was first proposed by Szabo [34]. It is originally
defined as a set of digital protocols within which the parties abide by some pre-agreed
commitments. In the blockchain system, the smart contract is designed as a self-executing
protocol that can verify or execute the fulfilment for the shared instruction code. The smart
contract is generally made up of two parts: the instruction code and the executed status.
The smart contract in the traditional blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum [23]
lacks privacy since the instruction code and executed status are publicly shared and visible
among all the participants (nodes) in the network. Recently, a new line of work [21,24,19,5]
claimed that they had solved these privacy issues by proposing the privacy-preserving smart
contract platforms. To verify the feasibility of our scheme, we selected Ekiden [11] and its
implementation Oasis Devnet as our privacy-preserving platform. Ekiden [11] combines
trusted execution environments (TEEs) and blockchain to achieve confidentiality as well
as decentralisation. It allows replicating the contract execution to TEE-powered nodes,
where these TEE-powered nodes guarantee the private state and data of the contracts by
encrypting them with crytographic keys only known to them.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we define the notation and recall a well-known cryptographic building block
that will be used in our construction.
3.1 Notation
Let λ be the security parameter, Σ(KeyGen, Sig,Vf) represent a standard signature scheme,
and SM.Enc(KeyGen,Enc,Dec) stand for symmetric encryption andASM.Enc(KeyGen,Enc,
Dec) refer to asymmetric encryption.
3.2 Fair blind signature
Informally, a fair blind signature is an interactive protocol between three parties: the user,
the issuer and the tracer. It is defined by eight probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms
Setup, KeyGen, Issuesig, Verifysig,Tracesig, Traceid, Matchsig, and Matchid as follows. For a
formal functional definition of fair blind signature schemes see for example [1], [15].
– Setup is a parameter generation algorithm that takes the security parameter λ, and
outputs the common parameters params for the following algorithms; params ←
Setup(1λ).
Auditable Credential Anonymity Revocation 5
– KeyGen is a key generation algorithm that takes the parameter params, and outputs a
key pair (sk, pk); (sk, pk)← KeyGen(params).
– Issuesig is an algorithm that takes the message msg and outputs a blind signature;
Σmgs ← Issuesig(msg).
– Verifysig is an algorithm to verify the signature Σmgs. It outputs 1 if sigm is valid, and 0
otherwise; 0/1← Verifysig(Σmgs).
– Tracesig is a revocation algorithm that generates a resulting signature sig
′
m, where this
signature is yielded from the target session identifier idu; sig
′
u ← Tracecred(idu).
– Traceid is a revocation algorithm that generates the session identifier id
′
u which has
produced target signature sigu; id
′
u ← Traceid(sigu).
– Matchsig is a matching algorithm that examines whether the original signature sigu
matches to the resulting signature sig′u or not. It outputs 1 if they match, and 0 otherwise;
0/1← Matchsig(sigu, sig′u).
– Matchid is a matching algorithm that examines whether the original session identifier
idu matches to the resulting identifier id
′
u or not. It outputs 1 if they match, and 0
otherwise; 0/1← Matchid(idu, id′u).
4 Construction Overview
An auditable blind credential system has six participants (see Fig. 1): the issuer, the user,
the verifier, the tracer, the inspector and the privacy-preserving smart contract platform.
The user is the holder of a credential. The issuer is in charge of blindly issuing a credential.
The verifier is responsible for checking the validity of the credential. The tracer is used to
reveal the relationship of the credential and its identity. It is noted that, to have a clear
understanding, we introduce the concept of tracer and allow both the issuer and the verifier
to act as the tracer. The inspector is used to check the suspicious revocation activities and
report them. The privacy-preserving smart contract platform is employed as a revelator to
provide the revocation service. The privacy-preserving smart contract platform includes two
types of blockchain nodes: the TEE-powered blockchain nodes and the consensus nodes. The
TEE-powered blockchain nodes are composed of the contract TEE and the key manager
TEE, where contract TEE is used to execute the smart contract and then encrypt the
resulting state with the key from the key manager TEE. The consensus nodes are used to
achieve the agreement of the encrypted state of the smart contract.
In general, a basic version of auditable blind credential system works as follows: the
system sets up the parameters and prepares for the key pairs for the issuer, the user and
the tracer. Then, the system sends a smart contract to a TEE-powered blockchain node to
obtain a privacy-preserving contract ̂contract, in which the method name, arguments, and
return data are externally invisible. Then, the system invokes the ̂contract through contract
TEE to generate the tracing key pair (xt, yt). The private key xt is kept secretly, and only
contract TEE can access it internally. Key yt is public and is used in the issuing protocol.
Next, the user authenticates himself to the issuer to obtain an anonymous credential. After
that, the user shows the credential to the verifier who wants to check the validity. So far,
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Table 1. A high-level description of anonymity revocation with blockchain
System Setup
params ← Setup(1λ); the system takes 1λ and outputs the system parameters params. (sk∗, pk∗) ←
KeyGenentities(params); the entities (issuer, user, tracer) input params and output their key pair (sk∗, pk∗).
Smart Contract Registration
̂contract ← Deploycontract(params, code); the system takes params and a piece of contract code code and outputs
the privacy-preserving smart contract ̂contract.
(skt, pkt)← KeyGenppsc(params, ̂contract); given params and ̂contract, KeyGenppsc generates the tracing key paris
(skt, pkt).
Credential Generation
sigattrs ← Issuesig(attrs, pkt, . . . ); the issuer inputs the user’s attributes attrs and public tracing key pkt, etc., and
outputs the signature of these attributes.
credu ← FormCred(attrs, sigattrs); the issuer inputs the attributes and its signature and outputs a credential.
Credential Verification
0/1← Verifysig(credu); the verifier checks the signature of the credential credu with output 0 or 1.
Credential Tracing
credu ← Tracecred(id′u); Tracecred takes the identity id
′
u and outputs the credential of that identity.
trancred ← FormTrans(credu, ̂contract); the tracer invokes ̂contract to obtain the trancred that contains the
encrypted credu.
Identity Tracing
idu ← Traceidentity(cred′u); Traceidentity takes the credential cred
′
u and outputs the identity of that credential.
tranid ← FormTrans(idu, ̂contract); the tracer invokes ̂contract to obtain the tranid that contains the encrypted
idu.
Tracing Inspection
viewst ← Collecttrans(pkt, type); the inspector scans the blockchain to collect the tracer’s invoking records (represented
as the transactions) depending on the type of identity tracing or credential tracing.
0/1← Inspecttrans(viewst); the inspector takes the viewst and outputs the inspection result.
Tracer
Issuer
Inspector
Verifier
User
Block Block Block Block
Blockchain Consensus Nodes
TEE-powered Blockchain Nodes
Contract 
TEE
Key Manager
TEE
Secure 
channel
Fig. 1. Overview of our construction
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due to the blind issuance, neither the issuer nor the verifier knows the relationship of the
credential and its holder.
In the revocation stage, the tracer firstly builds an encrypted and authenticated channel
with the contract TEE (one crucial property of remote attestation [25] in TEE). Then,
given the user’s identifier or the anonymous credential, the ̂contract lifts the blindness
and returns the result to the tracer bearing a transaction. Due to the protection of the
encrypted channel, the contents of the transaction including the input and the output data
are kept secret. However, the invoking records of the transaction remain visible and become
immutable because of the confirmation by the consensus nodes. Alternatively, any entity can
see the fact that the tracer is interacting with the contract, but nobody except the tracer
knows the exact data in the transaction. Subsequently, the inspector scans the blockchain
to collect the tracer’s calling records and inspect the suspicious credential tracing activity.
We give a high-level description in Table 1.
5 Concrete Instantiation
In this section, we present an instantiation based on Abe’s [1] blind signature scheme and
the privacy-preserving smart contract platform of Ekiden [11]. For security and efficiency
purposes, we slightly modified Abe’s [1] scheme by using elliptic curve cryptography. Thus,
all the following arithmetic operations are based on addition of points and hereafter unless
otherwise noted.
Let G be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that generates an elliptic curve
group (E(Zp), p, q, g, h)← G(1λ), where p is a big prime number, q is the order and (g, h)
are elements of E(Zp). Hash functions H1 : {0, 1}? → 〈g〉,and H2,H3 : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}|q|
are defined. The function H1 refers to mapping an arbitrary string to an element of the
subgroup 〈g〉 and function H2 and function H3 all refer to mapping an arbitrary string to
an element of Zq with the fixed length.
Key Generation The issuer generates a public key y and a tag key z, where x ∈ Zq , y =
gxmod q and z = H1(p, q, g, h, y). A user generates a key pair (γ, ξ), where γ ∈ Zq and
ξ = gγmod q . To simplify the instantiation, we use the session identifiers to represent the
user’s identity and allow one user to generate multiple identities (γ1, ξ1), (γ2, ξ2), . . . (γn, ξn).
Similarly, the tracer generates the session key pair (ι, τ), where ι ∈ Zq and τ = gτ mod q.
It should be noted that the tracer’s session key is only used to establish the authenticated
channels to the contract TEE.
Contract Registration The system compiles pieces of code of a smart contract ̂contract and
sends its bytecode to a TEE-powered blockchain node. Then, the TEE-powered blockchain
node first loads bytecode into the contract TEE. Then, the contract TEE creates a new
contract identifier ppsc, obtains a fresh internal contract key pair (pkincid, sk
in
cid) and an
internal state key kstate from the key manager TEE. Thereafter, the contract TEE outputs
an encrypted initial contract state stateinit = SM.Enc(kstate,−−−→state0) and an attestation
Ωcid, where Ωcid is used to prove the correctness of this initialization. After that, the
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TEE-powered blockchain node gets a proof pi of Ωcid by the attestation service and push the
final composition ( ̂contract, pkincid, stateinit, Ωcid, pi) to the blockchain consensus nodes. The
blockchain consensus nodes would like to accept this smart contract if all the attestations and
proofs are verified successfully. As for parameter registration, given the common parameters
of E(Zp) and the public key of an issuer, say pki, ̂contract takes a random number xt under
Zq as the private tracing key and generates its public key yt = gxtmod q. The private key
xt is held by the secret state, which can only be accessed by the contract TEE internally.
5.1 Blind Issuance
Credential Generation Credential generation is an interactive protocol that involves only
the user and issuer, which means that it runs independently from the privacy-preserving
smart contract. The main idea of this protocol is witness indistinguishable [14]. Namely,
the issuer owns a key pair (x, y) where x ∈ Zq, y = gxmod q , and a “one-time” tag key pair
(ω, z) , where ω ∈ Zq, z = gω. The signature can only be issued by the real private key x but
no one can distinguish which of the two secret keys (x or ω) was used. A full description
is as follows: The user firstly computes zu = z1/γ and proves to the issuer that logg ξ is
equal to logzu z. Then, the issuer generates random string υ, and computes z1 = y
υ
t and
z2 = zu/z1, and then proves to the user that z1 is made as it should be. Based on y, z1, z2,
the issuer and the user engage in an interactive proof protocol, in a witness indistinguishable
way, to prove the knowledge of the following two parts:
– y-side: proof of knowledge of x of y = gx.
– z-side: proof of knowledge of (ω1, ω2) of b1 = gω1 , b2 = gω2 .
After that, the user blinds (z1, zu) into (ξ1, z) by raising them with the private key λ
under the standard diversion technique [27]. The converted proof is eventually transformed
to a signature with the Fiat-Shamir technique. Next, the issuer stores ξυ as the identity of
this session. Clearly, ξυ is easy to map to known ξ which is verified in key generation step.
Finally, the user outputs a credu with Σ, say Σ = (ζ1, ρ, ω, σ1, σ2, δ,m) is the signature for
the message m.
Credential Verification Credential verification, proceeding after credential generation, is
another interactive protocol that runs independently from blockchain involving only the
user and the verifier. We say a credential (Σ,m) is valid if it satisfies:
ω + δ = H2(ζ1|gρyω|gσ1ζδ1 |hσ2(z/ζ1)δ|m).
5.2 Auditable Revocation
Credential Tracing Credential Tracing is an interactive protocol that involves the tracer,
the TEE-powered blockchain node and blockchain consensus nodes. It covers the following
sub-protocols:
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1. A tracer first fetches the pkcid of the tracing contract ̂contract, and then encrypts the
input of the user’s identity ξυ as inptc = ASM.Enc(pkcid, ξυ) and sends the ̂contract
within inptc to a TEE-powered blockchain node. Obviously, the input of this smart
contract remains secret due to encryption.
2. To start the process of the execution, the TEE-powered blockchain node first loads the
contract ̂contract, the input inptc and the previous encrypted state stateinit into the
contract TEE.
3. The contract TEE decrypts inpc and stateinit with the keys from the key manager TEE,
and starts to execute the anonymity tracing function with output Icred and state statet.
Observes that,
Icred = (ξ
υ)xt = gγυxt = yγυt = ζ1. (1)
4. The contract TEE obtains a fresh symmetric-key koutcid from the key manager TEE and
calculates a new encrypted output outpTEEnew = SM.Enc(skoutcid , Icred) and a new encrypted
state stateTEEnew = SM.Enc(kstate, statet). Then, it sends stateTEEnew , outpTEEnew and the
proper attestation to the tracer through a secure channel established by the tracer’s
session keys (ι, τ).
5. The tracer acknowledges the reception by calling back the TEE-powered blockchain node,
which triggers the contract TEE to send the transaction tran = ( ̂contract, outpTEEnew ,
stateTEEnew , proof) to the blockchain. proof is used to protect the integrity of the trans-
action and the correnctness of the outpTEEnew and stateTEEnew .
6. Once the consensus nodes confirm ̂contract, the contract TEE decrypts outpTEEnew and
stateTEEnew as outptnew and statetnew and then sends them to the tracer through the
mentioned secure channel.
7. The tracer parses the outptnew and statetnew and ultimately learns Icred that is the
relationship of the credential and that real owner.
Among all the sub-protocols, we emphasize that the sub-protocols five and six are atomic
operations, and we refer to [11] for more details. Also, we highlight two main features. Firstly,
̂contract will be confirmed by the consensus nodes mentioned in sub-protocol six. Thus, the
contract invoked eventually becomes immutable and auditable. Second, the output outptnew
and state statetnew are kept secret in the whole life of the execution and transmission.
Identity Tracing Identity tracing and the credential tracing have the same tracing mechanism.
Due to the space limit, we skip its full description. Observes that,
Iid = ζ
1/xt
1 = z
λ/xt
1 = y
υλ/xt
t = g
υλ = ξυ. (2)
Since ξυ is stored or published by the issuer, the tracer can instantly identify the user
who issued the credential.
Tracing Inspection The tracing activities checking is straightforward. Given the inspector
type (identity tracing or credential tracing) and the smart contract identifier, the inspector
scans the blockchain to collect all the transactions related to this contract. Then, the
inspector checks all these transactions to recognise suspicious activities.
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6 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented a proof of concept of our instantiation. Next we report on our proof of
concept and its performance. The corresponding code has been made available open source
and is to be found at https://github.com/typex-1/auditable-credential-core.
6.1 Implementation
We focus on implementing the blind issuance protocols and the anonymity revocation
smart contracts, and leave the implementation of the menthoned TEE-related protocols to
the Oasis Devnet [11]. Specifically, our implementation is divided into two modules: the
issuing module and the tracing module. The issuing module covers the protocol of credential
generation and credential verification, and it is realised by Python in 168 lines of code.
The issuing module is responsible for blindly issuing credentials and verifying the issued
ones. Meanwhile, the tracing module which performs the protocol of credential tracing and
identity tracing is achieved by Solidity in 449 lines of code and deployed in Oasis Devnet.
The tracing module allows the tracer to uncover the identity of a credential or the credential
of a specific user.
// example code;
mapping (address => uint256) private CredentialTraceResults;
function CredentialRevocation (uint256 upsilon) {
CredentialTraceResults[upsilon] = power(upsilon, xt, p);
}
Two key properties are highlighted in our implementation: the full protection of private
state and the auditable anonymity tracing records. The full protection of private state is
represented as that the input data and the output data in the contract are kept secret
in the full life cycle. For example, as is shown in the example code, the parameter of
CredentialTraceResults is designed to privately store the relationship of the identity and
credential. The other entities can not read them unless through an end-to-end secure channel
that has been established with the contract TEE. The auditability of anonymity tracing
records is evident in that all the smart contract invoking records are publicly visible and
immutable (The Fig. 2 is a smart contract creation and invoking example). In addition,
we provide a web-based client to present an interactive process of credential and identity
tracing and show the full code in the repository4.
6.2 Evaluation
Our performance evaluation covers five operations: tracing parameter generation, credential
issuing, credential verifying, credential tracing and identity tracing (see Table 2). All
experiments are conducted on a Dell precision 3630 tower with 16GB of RAM and one
3.7GHz six core i7-8700K processors running Ubuntu 18.04. Experiments are measured
4 https://github.com/typex-1/auditable-credential-core
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Fig. 2. Credential anonymity revocation records.
in seconds through wall clock run time, where a time difference is obtained between the
start and end of the code execution. To have an accurate and fair test result, we repeat
the measure for each execution 300 times and calculate its average. Also, to simplify the
performance evaluation, we measure the running time of each step and accumulate them
together if there are many steps involved. It is noted that, all operations take much less
than one second to complete and the credential issuing is the main performance bottleneck.
This operation takes more time than others because issuing a new credential requires many
interactions between users and issuers. Fortunately, this bottleneck can be ignored in real
applications because after all it meets the nature of credential using scenario, which means
a credential is issued only once but could be verified or traced multiple times.
We then examine the operating cost. Similar to the performance testing, the cost
evaluation covers five mentioned credential operations. Table 2 shows the data size and
the cost of these operations in gas under an elliptic curve with 128 bits security level. An
analysis of the data size and cost points to some trends. The data size of the operation
of parameter generation is the largest since this operation needs to register the group
parameters to the smart contract. Surprisingly, the cost of the parameter generation is not
the largest as this operation does not cover the complex computations. On the contrary, the
data size of the operation of the credential issuing and verifying is zero, and there is no gas
cost since these operations are executed independently from the blockchain. Meanwhile, the
credential tracing and the identity tracing have static gas cost since the length of input data
of these operations is constant, and the data handling procedure is fixed. In our scheme, a
one-time elliptic-curve exponentiation (see Equations (1) and (2)) is adequate to conduct
the complete tracing activity. The gas cost of the one-time computation is quite lower and
more easier to adopt by users when compared with some blockchain-based applications such
as [4,32], where they have massive elliptic-curve exponentiation operations and significant
cost.
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Table 2. The performance, input data size, cost and latency of various operations.
Operation Performance (seconds) Size (bytes) Gas Latency (seconds)
Parameter generation 0.00084 260 20672 14.781
Credential issuing 0.00740 0 0 1.601
Credential verifying 0.00232 0 0 1.175
Credential tracing 0.00306 132 390261 17.538
Identity tracing 0.00455 132 388944 18.905
Finally, we conduct latency testing as latency is an essential consideration for adopting a
system. For our implementation, the latency time includes blockchain confirming time, the
network request time and network response time. It is observed that the latency of credential
issuing as well as identity verifying is much smaller than other operations. The main reason
behind this is that these two operations run independently from blockchain and do not wait
for the block to be confirmed. Meanwhile, the average latency of credential tracing and
identity tracing is approximately eighteen seconds, which would be a primary drawback
of our system. Given these latency constraints, our system, at least built on the current
version of Oasis Devnet is not suitable for applications that require fast credential tracing
or identity tracing. However, for some privacy-priority applications such as medical record
tracing system, our scheme provides a powerful framework to protect patients’ privacy.
The main roadblock to the business adoption of blockchain is its low throughput
of on-chain transaction. Our system, armed with the blockchain and trusted execution
environment, suffers the same scalability issues. Fortunately, the flexible smart contract
makes our scheme easier to support batch anonymity revealing. This means a tracer can
collect a group of credentials and send them the blockchain once. With such a mechanism,
a massive chunk of tracing transactions can be off-loaded from the blockchain, which
mitigates the scalability flaw. Meanwhile, some efforts [13,35] have been made to increase
the scalability of the blockchain. Our system would benefit from these works.
7 Example Applications
Our scheme has numerous practical applications in some privacy-sensitive scenarios. Two
typical use cases are described as follows:
Medical record protection Our scheme may be used for privacy medical record protection
specifically for unrestricted research purposes. A medical record is supposed to be very
sensitive in some cases such as in HIV and sexually transmitted infections. A hospital might
share the medical record with a research institution without patients’ permission thereby
causing information leakage. Our mechanism allows the hospital to show the real patient
records without knowing the patients’ real identities, so privacy is respected. In the case of
family genetic disorder, patients may disclose their identities to the research institution on
their own free will by invoking the privacy-preserving smart contract.
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Vehicle registration management Traditionally, the vehicle registration office issues a vehicle
plate number knowing all the identities and corresponding car information. If someone
with an intent to identify the specific driver colludes with the registration office, privacy
invasion occurs. Moreover, the plate number may become a surveillance tool in conjunction
with a closed-circuit television camera, which is in wide use almost anywhere. Our scheme
allows the issuance of a vehicle plate number without the vehicle registration office knowing
the relationship between the number and the driver’s identity. Furthermore, it allows the
certificate to be traced in an auditable way when some emergencies such as traffic accidents.
8 Conclusion
Anonymity credentials and anonymity revocation were proposed several decades ago,
but they have not yet gained significant adoption. Some potential obstacles are the lack
of auditability and neutrality for the revocation process. In this paper, we proposed a
blockchain-powered traceable anonymous credential framework. Our approach allows the
issuer to blindly issue a credential, then leverages a privacy-preserving smart contract that
acts as a revelator to trace the credential. More importantly, all these tracing activities are
auditable due to the immutable smart contract calling records provided by the public ledger.
The auditability and neutrality guaranteed by the blockchain avoid misuse of tracing and
potential collision problems to a great extent.
Future work. Even if our scheme provides a powerful approach to trace the anonymity
with auditability, in practice, it is still possible that one of a tracer’s private keys is stolen
or misused. Fortunately, the flexibility of smart contract makes our scheme amenable to
support threshold-revealing using well-known multiparty computation techniques.
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